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The twenty-first century oil and gas boom in the Lone Star State stimulated
the industry and enriched Texas landowners.' However, the technologies
credited with igniting this boom, hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling,
could not prevent the historic boom-to-bust cycle. 2 Instead, the production
unleashed from shale plays in Texas and other states created a world-wide glut,
sinking oil prices from highs above $100 to a low of $26 per barrel.3 Yet,
1. See Jennifer Hiller, A 21st-century oil boom in the Lone Star State, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-
NEws (Feb. 25, 2013, 6:46 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/A-21st-century-oil-
boom-in-the-Lone-Star-State-4303192.php; see also Vicki Vaughan, Texas is on its way to being 'Saudi
Texas', SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 17, 2013, 8:38 AM),
https://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Texas-is-on-its-way-to-being-Saudi-Texas-284822.php
("The Lone Star State is earning a new moniker: Saudi Texas").
2. See Javier Blas, The Dark Side ofAmerica's Rise to Oil Superpower, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2018,
4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/the-dark-side-of-america-s-rise-to-oil-
superpower (noting improved fracking methods and the fact that, "technology is key").
3. See id
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thanks in part to plays in West Texas, "Shale 2.0" is underway.4 The booms
have blessed-and cursed-Texas, leading to a variety of legal disputes.
5
Disputes that have plagued Texas courts for decades include those involving
ownership rights in the mineral estate. In fact, Texas courts have produced a
robust body of law regarding the interpretation of mineral and royalty deeds.
6
This article addresses the Texas Supreme Court's recent contribution to that
jurisprudence in Wenske v. Ealy.7 Wenske addressed this narrow issue: who
bears the burden of a pre-existing non-participating royalty interest (NPRI) in
the chain of title when a warranty deed conveys a fractional share of the
minerals to a grantee? The grantors argued that the burden passed exclusively
to the grantees.8 A five-justice majority of the Texas Supreme Court disagreed.
Instead, the opinion held that the plain language of the deed required the
grantors, who had expressly reserved a fractional share of the minerals, to share
the burden of the prior NPRI reservation in proportion to their interest in the
mineral estate.9
In an introduction, the opinion expresses this view of its interpretation of the
Wenske deed:
Doing so allows us to reinforce a trend in our mineral-deed jurisprudence.
Over the past several decades, we have incrementally cast off rigid,
mechanical rules of deed construction. We have warned against quick
resort to these default or arbitrary rules. And we do so again today by
reaffirming the paramount importance of ascertaining and effectuating the
parties' intent. We determine that intent by conducting a careful and
detailed examination of a deed in its entirety, rather than applying some
default rule that appears nowhere in the deed's text.io
This article analyzes Wenske and its implications for Texas's mineral-deed
jurisprudence. Part I provides an overview of the dispute and the court
decisions it generated, including a discussion of two problematic Texas
4. See id. (noting an increase in technology is paving the way to "Shale 2.0"); Saji Sam, Juan
Trebino, Bob Orr, & Robert D. Peterson, Oil's Boom-and-Bust Cycle May be Over. Here's Why,
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Mar. 1, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/oils-boom-and-bust-cycle-may-be-
over-heres-why ("The recent price swings highlight a new era of uncertainty gripping the world's energy
markets. As global oil producers work at cross-purposes, the industry's traditional boom-bust cycle is
being replaced by faster, shallower price rotations based on changes in production.").
5. Blas, supra note 2; see Lawrence Wright, The Dark Bounty of Texas Oil: Will the Booms and
Busts of the Energy Industry Always Dominate the State?, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/01/the-dark-bounty-of-texas-oil.
6. 1 have written extensively about specific or "perennial" issues raised by mineral deeds in Texas
and other states. See generally Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial
Problems in the Shale Era, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 97 (2013) (discussing the "mineral or royalty" issue; The
Duhig Rule; "Double and Restated Fractions" and other title issues).
7. 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
8. Id. at 796.
9. Id at 798 (Justice Brown delivered the majority opinion of the court and was joined by Chief
Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Guzman).
10. Id. at 792.
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Supreme Court opinions that it addresses, Bass v. Harper" and Pich v.
Lankford.12 Part II reviews the Texas Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Wenske and the cases comprising and contradicting "the trend" it follows and
the "default rules" the court has "cast off."13 This article concludes that,
consistent with the trend it identifies, the majority opinion provides guidelines
that promote title stability without compromising the goal in all document
interpretation cases: ascertaining the parties' intent.14 Moreover, unlike the
dissent, analyzed in Part III, the majority opinion has effectively clarified case
law and the role of standard deed form clauses.5 This article also discusses
other issues that the Texas Supreme Court should address as it continues to
develop Texas's mineral-deed jurisprudence in the next chapter of the Shale
Era.16
I. OVERvIEw: THE WENSKE DISPUTE AND THE COURTS' OPINIONS
The Wenske dispute involved a 2003 warranty deed in which the Wenskes
conveyed fifty-five acres in Lavaca County, Texas to the Ealys.1" The deed's
granting clause conveyed all the described acreage to the Ealys, but a
subsequent clause expressly reserved "For Grantor and Grantor's heirs,
successors, and assigns forever . .. an undivided 3/8ths of all oil, gas, and other
minerals . . . from the Property."18 Under a separate heading, "Exceptions to
Conveyance and Warranty," the deed referenced prior interests owned by third
parties created by reservation in a 1988 deed, a 1/4th floating non-participating
royalty interest.19 Following the reservation and exception clauses, the deed
11. 441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1969).
12. 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957).
13. As discussed infra in Part I, the cases the opinion identifies as consistent with "the trend" it
seeks to reinforce in Wenske include: Hysaw v. Dawkins, Concord Oil v. Pennzoil, and Luckel v. White.
Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d I (Tex. 2016); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co.,
966 S.W. 2d 451 (Tex. 1998); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). Two cases it identifies as
at odds with the trend are Bass v. Harper and Pich v. Lankford. Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.
1969); Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. 1957).
14. See Burney, supra note 6, at 100 n.13.
15. Among other issues, the majority opinion avoids the dissent's mistaken view of the role of the
"subject to" clause in form warranty deeds, and the role of the "two grant theory" in deed interpretation.
16. See infra Part IV. In particular, this section addresses a recent court of appeals decision, Bupp v.
Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 2800408, *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 3, 2018, pet.
denied), that raises questions about the language that drafters should include in standard form warranty
deeds to withhold a grantor's mineral or royalty interests from a conveyance of land, and about the
distinction, if any, between standard deed form terms: "exceptions" and "reservations." Another issue
addressed in this section is the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities when grantors reserve term
interests in the mineral estate. See ConocoPhillips Co., v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 865-67 (Tex.
2018) (analyzing whether the creation of a future interest in a non-participating royalty interest would
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities).
17. See Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Tex. 2017).
18. Id.
19. The reference to the prior 1/4th interest in this paragraph describes a mineral interest:
"undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the herein
described property . , . ." Id. at 793. However, the parties did not dispute that the prior interest was
instead a non-participating royalty interest and the mischaracterization was not an issue in the case. Id. at
793 n.2. The parties also agreed that the NPRI was floating rather than fixed, meaning the NPRI owners
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contained a "subject to" clause, the focus of the Wenskes' deed interpretation
argument: "Grantor, for the Consideration and subject to the Reservations from
Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty, grants, sells, and
conveys to Grantee the Property. . . ." (emphasis added).20
The Wenskes and Ealys agreed that the deed had created the following
interests in the fifty-five acres: the Ealys owned all of the surface and 5/8ths of
the mineral estate, while the Wenskes retained 3/8ths, meaning, the Wenskes
and Ealys were cotenants in the mineral estate.21 As cotenants, both parties had
the right to execute oil and gas leases22 and both did so in 201 1.23 In 2013, the
Wenskes filed a petition for declaratory judgment asserting their mineral
interest was free from the burden of the 1/4th NPRI reserved in 1988 and
referenced in the 2003 deed.24 However, the trial court disagreed and granted
the Ealys' cross-motion for summary judgment.25 In that motion, the Ealys
argued that the 2003 deed required the mineral cotenants to bear the burden of
the prior NPRI in proportion to their interests.26
A. Deed Language in the Court ofAppeals: "Subject To" and "Exception"
Clauses did not "Unburden" Grantors' Retained Mineral Interest from the
Prior NPRI
In 2016, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.27  In
reaching that conclusion, the appellate court addressed the Wenskes' deed
interpretation arguments and their view that the trial court's ruling contradicted
Bass v. Harper. Ultimately, the court of appeals concluded that Bass was not
controlling, and found no support in the deed's language for the Wenskes'
position.28 Instead, the appellate court, like the trial court, found the deed's
would receive 1/4th of the landowner's royalty reserved in any lease. See Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d
369, 374 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2017, pet. granted), affd 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017). Because
the parties agreed that the interest was a floating NPRI, they avoided two perennial title problems that
have plagued courts. Burney, supra note 6, at 114-26 (discussing the "mineral or royalty" and "fixed
versus floating NPRI" problems).
20. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 793.
21. See id. at 796.
22. See Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480-81 (Tex. 2011) (noting "bundle
of sticks" owned by mineral interest owners includes the executive right, or the right to lease). Texas
follows the majority rule that owners of a fractional interest in the mineral estate can lease their share
without joinder of the other cotenants, subject to a duty to account on a net profits basis. See Byrom v.
Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986) It has long been the rule in Texas that a cotenant has the
right to extract minerals from common property without first obtaining the consent of his cotenants;
however, he must account to them on the basis of the value of any minerals taken, less the necessary and
reasonable costs of production and marketing.
23. See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 793.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 794.
26. See id. at 793-94.
27. See id. at 794.
28. See Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2017, pet. granted), affid
521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017).
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language required the parties to bear the burden of the NPRI in proportion to
their fractional interests in the mineral estate.29
The court of appeals' interpretation of the deed's clauses incorporated
reviews of the terms of the 1988 deed reserving the NPRI, and of basic
property law principles. First, the court explained that, under the terms of the
1988 reservation, the NPRI owners were entitled to share in the proceeds from
production from the "entire mineral estate."30 Therefore, had the Wenskes
leased before conveying to the Ealys, their entire mineral estate would have
been burdened by the NPRI.31 It follows, that by retaining part of the mineral
estate in a subsequent conveyance, the Wenskes retained their share of the
burden.
Additionally, the opinion recites basic principles of conveying that have
been recognized by the Texas Supreme Court: "a deed will convey every
interest held by the grantor except that which is clearly reserved or excepted."32
In support of that proposition, the appellate court cited Day & Co. v. Texland
Petroleum,33 a 1990 Texas Supreme Court case that endorsed viewing a
warranty deed as passing the "greatest possible estate" to the grantee.34
Contradicting the Wenskes' view, "the greatest possible estate" would be one
unburdened, rather than solely burdened, by pre-existing NPRIs. Recognizing
that point, the 'court of appeals searched the deed's language for terms
supporting the Wenskes' view. Instead, the appellate court concluded that, "we
disagree with [the Wenskes] that they could be unburdened by the NPRI simply
by stating in the 2003 Deed that they conveyed the property to the Ealys
'subject to' the exception without even mentioning anything about royalties" or
that the burden of the NPRI "would be paid entirely by the Ealys."35
B. Case Law in the Court ofAppeals: Bass v. Harper Dismissed but a
"Default" Rule from Pich v. Lankford Endorsed
Throughout their briefing, the Wenskes claimed that a 1969 Texas Supreme
Court case, Bass v. Harper, instructed that a "subject to" clause operates to
place the burden of a prior NPRI solely on a grantee.36  Yet, the court of
appeals distinguished Bass because it dealt with a different title issue-
29. See id (citing Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. 1969)).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 373 ("Thus, had [the Wenskes] leased the mineral estate, [the NPRI owners] would
have received 1/4th of the royalties from production on the land, and [the Wenskes] would have
received a 3/4th share of the royalties.").
32. Id. at 375 (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990)); see
also Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952) (the Texas Supreme Court identified this "sound
elementary principal of conveyances": A warranty deed conveys all interests a grantor owns, absent
clear language reserving some interests in the grantor).
33. 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
34. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 375 (citing Day & Co. v. Texland Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 668
(Tex. 1990)).
3 5. Id.
36. See id. at 374.
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fractional interests in the mineral estate-and because it "[said] nothing" about
the prior-NPRI burden issue.37 Instead, the court of appeals pointed to a 1957
Texas Supreme Court case, Pich v. Lankford, and viewed that case as support
for a "default" rule requiring mineral estate cotenants to share the burden of a
prior NPRI in proportion to their interests.38 The Texas Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Wenske, however, criticized the appellate court for applying
a "default rule" to the Wenske deed.39 Regarding Bass, the Wenske majority
not only agreed that it did not control, but dismissed it as out of step with
Texas's "evolving mineral-deed-construction jurisprudence."40 On the other
hand, the Wenske dissent defended the precedential value of Bass and Pich.41
To assess these varying opinions, Bass and Pich are analyzed below. This
analysis supports the Wenske majority opinion's conclusion to limit the
precedential value of these two problematic opinions.
1. Bass v. Harper: An Example of "Perennial Problems" with Oil and Gas
Titles
The contradictory views espoused by the court of appeals, the majority, and
dissenting opinions in Wenske portend the problems with Bass v. Harper. The
Bass deeds, and the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Bass, invoke confusing
labels and expressions of fractional interests created by factors that writers have
explained and the Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged: The "estate
misconception" and "the legacy of the 1/8th landowner's royalty." The once-
common 1/8th landowner's lease royalty caused confusion about the estates
owned by landowners, which affected draffing.42 For example, an owner of an
undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate, who as a matter of law would
receive one-half of the once-common 1/8th lease royalty, would mistakenly




39. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Tex. 2017).
40. Id.
41. See id at 816 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
42. See generally Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 2016) ("The proper construction of
instruments containing double-fraction language is a dilemma of increasing concern in the oil and gas
industry, as uncertainty abounds, disputes proliferate, and courts have seemingly varied in their
approaches to this complicated issue."); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exp. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451,
454 (Tex. 1998) (noting confusion over a deed conveyance involving "a 1/96th interest" in minerals);
see also Laura H. Burney, The Legacy of the 1/8th Landowner's Royalty and the Texas Supreme Court:
Has Hysaw v. Dawkins Resolved the Double Fraction Dilemma, 58 S. TEX. L. REV. 115, 135 (2016)
(analyzing the court's holding in Hysaw and the "double fraction" dilemma).
43. Burney, supra note 6, at 123
Specifically, the sticks in the mineral-estate bundle consist of the following: "(1) the right to
develop (the right of ingress and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the
right to receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, [and] (5) the right to
receive [landowner's] royalty payments."
(quoting Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986)). The "estate misconception" led to
other problems. See Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 455 (acknowledging that because drafters
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In Bass, the Texas Supreme Court, as described below, falls prey to these
problems. However, the Wenske appellate court noted that the Bass deeds
contained classic terms used to create fractional interests in the mineral estate."
Specifically, Mr. Bass owned 8/14ths of the mineral estate under a ninety-acre
tract, while the other 6/14ths had been reserved earlier by a third party.4 5 Bass
executed a warranty deed granting an undivided one-half of his interest in the
mineral estate "subject to" the previously reserved 6/14ths mineral interest, to
the Millers.46 Because of other conveyances, the Bass-to-Miller deed defined
Ms. Harper's interest.47 Once the land was leased, an oil company concluded
that Ms. Harper owned a 2/7ths interest (or one-half of Bass's 8/14ths) and
credited her with that fractional share of the 1/8th lease royalty.48 Disagreeing
with the oil company, Bass's argument as described by the trial court was that
the "subject to" clause in his deed to Miller reserved 7/14ths in Bass and
conveyed only 1/14th to Miller. 49 Both the trial court and the court of appeals
rejected this argument and ruled in favor of Ms. Harper.
The appellate court in Bass, like the appellate court in Wenske, invoked
basic rules of conveying approved by the Texas Supreme Court: a warranty
deed "conveys the greatest estate possible," and "reservations must be made by
clear language."50 That court of appeals in Bass also agreed that Bass's deed
"did not expressly reserve any fixed amount of royalty interest in the grantor"
and that the "subject to" clause merely served to protect Bass from breaching
his warranty of title.5 1 Still reflecting effects of the "estate misconception,"
however, the court of appeals described Ms. Harper's interest as "2/7ths of the
royalty interest," rather than as a 2/7ths mineral interest that would entitle her
to that fractional share of the 1/8th landowner's lease royalty.52
were mistaken about the size of their mineral interests, multiclause deed forms contained
conflicting fractions, all multiples of the once-common 1/8th lease royalty).
44. See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 794-96 (noting that the Bass-to-Miller deed refers to the outstanding
6/14ths as a "mineral interest"); Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Tex. App-Corpus
Christi 2016, pet. granted), affd 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017) (recognizing other deeds affecting the title
use classic mineral terms "oil, gas and other minerals in and under the land"); see also Altman,
712 S.w.2d at 118 (holding the inclusion of the language "in and under" creates a mineral interest rather
than a non-participating royalty interest).
45. See Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. 1969); Bass v. Harper, 437 S.W.2d 648, 649-50
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ granted), rev'd441 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1969).
46. Bass, 441 S.W.2d at 826.
47. See id ("For purposes of this opinion, it will be assumed that the defendant Harper received and
owns whatever royalty interest was conveyed in the instrument from Bass to W. 0. Miller.").
48. See Bass, 437 S.W.2d at 650 (noting Sinclair's division order credited Lucille Harper with
2/7ths of a 1/8th royalty).
49. Id. (noting the 'Subject to' clause cannot be enlarged to include a royalty reservation of 7/14ths
in Bass and conveying only 1/14th to Miller in the warranty deed since no such express provision was
written into the deed.").
50. See id. at 651; Laura H. Burney, The Supreme Court's Evolving Mineral-Deed Jurisprudence in
the Shale Era: The Implications of Wenske v. Ealy, OIL, GAS & MIN. TITLE EXAMINATION COURSE 1, 3
(2018).
51. Id. at 651; Burney, supra note 50, at 3.
52. Id. at 650.
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Despite that labeling flaw, the Bass appellate opinion had adhered to "sound
elementary rules of conveying" the Texas Supreme Court has long
recognized.53 The lower court's Bass opinion also reflects the role of a "subject
to" clause as one generally used to protect a grantor from breaching his
warranty of fitle. 54 The Wenske majority, as described below, restores these
positive aspects of the Bass appellate opinion.
Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court reversed in Bass and held the deed
at issue "granted and conveyed a 1/14th of the 1/8th royalty."5 5 That 1969
opinion contains the following problems, which the Texas Supreme Court has
since addressed. First, Bass perpetuated "estate misconception" problems by
viewing the interests at issue as royalty interests, rather than as mineral
interests (and at one point as "mineral royalty" interests),5 6 and by expressing
those interests with double fractions." Second, that opinion contradicted the
appellate court's view of the "subject to" clause in the deed as one limiting the
warranty, and perpetuated the problematic view advanced by the Wenskes.58
The Wenskes argued Bass required a ruling that the "subject to" clause in their
warranty deed served to pass the entire burden of an outstanding NPRI to their
grantees.59
In addition to these problems, Bass should be dismissed as irrelevant to the
Wenske issue. Bass did not involve an outstanding NPRI or the issue of
whether the burden of that interest passed solely to a grantee in a warranty deed
in which the grantor expressly reserved a fractional share of the minerals. In
53. Id. at 651 (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.3d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)); Burney, supra note 50, at
3.
54. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. 2017) ("[T]he principal function of a subject-to
clause in a deed is to protect a grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when some mineral interest
is already outstanding.") (citing Ernest E. Smith, The "Subject To" Clause, 30 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. § 15.01 (1984)).
55. Bass v. Harper, 441 S.W.2d 825, 825 (Tex. 1969). As more evidence of the confusion prevailing
in the Bass opinions, the Texas Supreme Court held: "We reverse and here direct the entry of judgment
by the trial court that the instrument granted and conveyed a 1/14th of the 1/8th royalty." Id. However,
the appellate opinion had affirmed the trial court's ruling in favor of Ms. Harper. Bass, 437 S.W.2d at
651.
56. The terms "mineral" and "royalty" have separate meanings in Texas and combining those labels
causes confusion. See Burney, supra note 6, at 126-28 (discussing the value of the "royalty" label and
the problems created by French v. Chevron). In Louisiana, a state with unique mineral law jurisprudence
rooted in a Civil Law Code, the label "mineral royalty" is a recognized term. See Vincent v. Bullock,
192 La. 1, 6 (LA 1939).
57. Bass, 441 S.W.2d at 825-27.
58. See id. at 827 (viewing the "subject to" clause as limiting the conveyance, rather than the
warranty).
59. However, the Wenskes had strong support for their view of Bass from a respected title attorney,
Bill Buford. See Brief for William B. Buford as Amicus Curiae, Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791
(Tex. 2017) (No. 16-0353), 2016 WL 3950655 at *4. (Mr. Buford viewed Bass as controlling and urged
the Texas Supreme Court to confirm whether it was still "good law." The answer the court provided is
not the one Mr. Buford supports, and he is not alone.) See also Thomas Ciarlone, Jr., Texas High Court
Ruling Sows Confusion on Mineral Deeds, LAW360 (July 18, 2017, 11:31 AM),
https://www.1aw360.com/articles/945059/texas-high-court-ruling-sows-confusion-on-mineral-deeds
("The Texas Supreme Court proceeded to express a surprising level of contempt for what it styled as
'default,' 'arbitrary' and even 'arcane' rules of construction, such as those that the Thirteenth Court of
Appeals had tried to distill down from the decision in Bass.").
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fact, the Texas Supreme Court framed the issue in Bass as: "The problem in
this suit for a declaratory judgment is to determine the amount of oil and gas
royalty which was conveyed from the plaintiff, Thomas E. Bass, to W. 0.
Miller under whom the defendant Harper claims."60 Fortunately, the Texas
Supreme Court seized the opportunity presented in Wenske and limited the
precedential value of Bass as inconsistent with Texas's "evolving mineral-
deed-construction jurisprudence."61
2. Pich v. Lankford: A Split Decision at Odds with Texas's "Evolving
Mineral-Deed-Construction Jurisprudence."
In describing Texas's "evolving mineral-deed-construction jurisprudence,"
the Wenske majority notes that the Court has "cast off' and "warned against"
resort to "default" rules.62 For that reason, the majority disapproved of the
court of appeals' view that Pich v. Lankford created a "default rule" requiring
mineral cotenants to proportionally bear the burden of prior NPRIs. 63 Although
that conclusion reflects the extent of the majority opinion's discussion of Pich,
other reasons exist for treating that case like Bass: an opinion at odds with
Texas's evolving mineral-deed jurisprudence.
Pich involved complicated conveyances reeking of estate-misconception
issues and confused labeling of interests. For example, the initial deed from
Pich to a grantee reserved "one half of the full 1/8th Oil Royalty, or a 1/16th of
all minerals produced on said land."' Following several other conveyances
and re-conveyances, the deed before the courts raised this problem: how to
interpret a deed that claimed to "Save and Except" a 3/4ths mineral interest
owned by third parties when that recital proved false. In other words, while
there were prior reservations of non-participating royalties expressed in smaller
fractions, the reference to a 3/4ths mineral interest outstanding in third parties
was wrong. The court of appeals, affirming the trial court's judgment, viewed
the "Save and Except" language not as a reservation of any interest in the
grantor, but merely as language intended to protect grantors from breaching a
warranty of title by providing notice of prior interests, even though they were
incorrectly labeled.65 The Pich appellate court, like those in Bass and Wenske,
also relied on basic rules of conveying: "deeds must be construed most strongly
against the grantors so as to pass the largest estate possible to the grantees."66
60. Bass, 441 S.W.2d at 825.
61. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Tex. 2017).
62. Id. at 792.
63. See Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957).
64. Id. at 646.
65. See id. at 648 (noting court of appeals approved of respondents' view that the false recital had
not reserved any interests but provided notice of previously reserved NPRIs).
66. Id; see generally Zackary D. Callarman, The Pich Exception: Reservations, Exceptions to
Warranty, and Exceptions to Grant in the Chain of Title, 5 LSU J. ENERGY L. & REs. 45, 57 (2017)
(elaborating on the Pich exception).
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As in Bass, the Texas Supreme Court reversed Pich.67 In an opinion that
departed from the basic rules of conveying the lower courts had embraced, the
high court created a "false recital" exception based on precedent from other
jurisdictions.68 Specifically, the opinion cites cases from Vermont, Minnesota,
Georgia, and Kentucky to support this view: "The chain of title conclusively
negatives the recitals. It shows they are false. The giving of a false reason for
an exception from a grant does not operate to alter or cut down the interest or
estate excepted, nor does it operate to pass the excepted interest or estate to the
grantee."69 Further departing from the lower courts' views, the Texas Supreme
Court opinion concluded that the "Save and Except" clause effectively reserved
interests in the grantors.70
A dissenting opinion in Pich by Justice Garwood chastised the majority for
departing from an opinion the Texas Supreme Court had approved, Klein v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co.7 The lower courts in Pich had relied on Klein in
support of their view that the "Save and Except" clause protected the grantors
from a breach of warranty. Regarding the "false" nature of the recital, the
dissent challenged the majority to "concede" that by reviewing all the language
in the deed, as required by Klein, the reference to the 3/4ths mineral interest
could be interpreted as referring to the outstanding interests, whether mineral or
royalty.72 With this focus on Texas precedent and the four-comers of the deed,
Justice Garwood's dissenting opinion in Pich-unlike the Bass and Pich
majorities-aligns with the Texas Supreme Court's mineral-deed-construction
jurisprudence as identified in Wenske.
II. WENSKE: THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. Cases Comprising the "Trend" and "Default Rules" Cast-Off
1. Bass v. Harper and Pich v. Lankford: Dismissed as at Odds with the
"Trend"
Five Texas Supreme Court justices affirmed the appellate court's ruling that
the deed's language required the Wenskes and Ealys to share the burden of the
prior NPRI in proportion to their fractional interests in the mineral estate.
73
However, as described above, this opinion departs from the court of appeals'
67. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 650.
68. See id. at 648-50.
69. Id. at 648-49 (finding only one Texas case that involved not mineral titles but the existence of a
public thoroughfare (citing Umscheid v. Scholz, 16 S.W. 1065, 1066 (Tex. 1891)).
70. See id. at 646-48.
71. Id. at 650 (Garwood, J., dissenting) (citing Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff'd86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935)).
72. Id. at 651-52 (Garwood, J., dissenting) (noting that parties often use the terms "royalty" and
"mineral" interchangeably in reaching his conclusion about the deed's plain meaning).
73. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. 2017) (Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the
court, joined by Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Guzman).
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views of Bass and Pich. After devoting several paragraphs to Bass, the opinion
determined that, "We do not reject Bass as mistaken jurisprudence and we do
not overrule it. But today, in light of our evolving mineral-deed-construction
jurisprudence, courts and practitioners should view Bass as limited to the
specific language at issue in that case."74 Recall also that this opinion criticized
the lower court for its view that Pich created a "default" rule in support of the
proportionate-sharing holding.7 5 This Part identifies other "default" rules the
majority opinion views as having been "cast off," and the cases and rules that
comprise Texas's "evolving mineral-deed-construction jurisprudence."
2. Luckel and Concord Oil: Endorsed for Rejecting "Granting Clause
Prevails" Rule and "Two Grant" Doctrine in Favor of a "Harmonizing"
Approach Focused on Ascertaining Intent
Although the Wenske majority opinion does not provide a list of cases
endorsed and dismissed, one can be compiled from its analysis and citations.
To begin, in support of its rejection of "mechanical rules of construction," the
opinion cites Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co.,76 and Luckel v.
White," two Texas Supreme Court cases that addressed a problematic deed
form and the interpretation disputes it spawned.78 The deed form at issue in
those cases included multiple clauses: a granting clause; a "subject to and
covers and includes" clause; and a "future lease" clause.79 As I, and other
writers, have explained, this deed form evolved in response to a 1923 Texas
Supreme Court case, Caruthers v. Leonard,80 which was later overruled.81
Caruthers incorrectly held that if an owner conveyed a fractional interest in her
mineral estate while the land was leased, that subsequent conveyance did not
transfer a proportionate share of the delay rentals and landowner's lease royalty
provided in the lease.82 In response, a deed form developed to clarify that, for
example, if the deed conveyed an undivided one-half of the minerals to the
74. Id at 795 ("Our reasoning in Bass should remain limited to the specific wording of the
instrument in that case. Our analysis relied, in large part, on the location of the subject-to clause in the
deed.").
75. Id. ("It held that because the deed provided no guidance on how to allocate the burden of the
Vyvjala NPRI, the alleged 'default rule' from Pich v. Lankford should apply: 'Ordinarily the royalty
interest . .. would be carved proportionately from the two mineral ownerships. . .. ' (quoting Pich v.
Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957))).
76. 966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998).
77. 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
78. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 794 ("In Luckel, we rejected mechanical rules of construction, such as
giving priority to certain clauses over others, or requiring the use of so-called 'magic words."').
79. See Burney, supra note 42, at 120-22 (noting "[w]riters labeled [the interpretive approach
surrounding multi-clause deeds as] the 'two-grant' doctrine"). The appellate court in Concord Oil
viewed that deed as lacking a "future lease" clause; the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that the
presence or absence of such a clause was not determinative. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 454.
80. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. 1923), abrogated by 294 S.W. 835 (Tex. 1927).
81. Id. at 783.
82. See id at 782-83.
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grantee, that grantee would receive one-half of the rentals and royalties under
the existing or any future leases.83
Unfortunately, this deed form provided a blank for the drafters to insert the
intended fraction in each of the multiple paragraphs. When drafters insert the
same fraction in each paragraph, the deed serves the intended purpose without
creating interpretation issues. However, due to the "estate misconception" and
the "legacy of the 1/8th landowner's royalty," drafters too frequently completed
these deeds following this pattern: the deeds contain differing fractions, but all
multiples of the once-common 1/8th landowner's royalty. The Luckel and
Concord Oil deeds reflected these problems: Luckel: "1/32nd royalty interest"
in the granting clause and "one-fourth of future royalties" in subsequent
clauses;84 Concord Oil: "1/96 interest in minerals" in the granting clause and
"1/12 of all rentals and royalty" in a subsequent clause.85
Note that these deed forms developed to clarify that the grantee of a single
fractional interest in the mineral estate received a proportionate amount of the
rentals and royalties in any oil and gas lease. Today, court decisions recognize
that a grantee receives those lease benefits as a matter of law, meaning the
multiple clauses are not necessary.86 Yet, because multiclause deed forms with
conflicting fractions appeared in deed records throughout Texas, courts were
faced with interpretation issues long before Luckel and Concord Oil.87
In a 1959 decision, Garrett v. Dils,88 the Texas Supreme Court appeared to
have adopted the approach it reconfirmed decades later in Concord Oil.
89 But
other opinions adopted the view that these deeds made "two grants" in the
separate clauses.90 However, in 1984, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a
different approach. In Alford v. Krum,91 a majority opinion adopted the type of
"bright line" or "default rule" now rejected by the Texas Supreme Court: the
granting clause prevails over other clauses.92 In 1991, the Court overruled
Alford in Luckel v. White.93 But, because of conflicting views among the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Luckel, the law regarding the
interpretation of these multiclause deed forms with conflicting fractions
83. See id. at 783; see also Burney, supra note 42, at 119-20 (highlighting the role of "estate
misconception" and the legacy of the 1/8th royalty deed).
84. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459,460-61 (Tex. 1991).
85. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 452-53 (Tex. 1998).
86. See Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed
Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 107 (1993) (finding the two-grant doctrine arbitrary).
87. See Burney, supra note 42, at 120; see also Burney, supra note 86, at 86.
88. 299 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1957).
89. See id at 907 (holding that deed with fractions 1/64th and 1/8th conveyed a single 1/8th mineral
interest because fraction 1/64th could be explained as representing amount of royalty owed to a 1/8th
mineral owner (1/8 times 1/8 lease royalty equals 1/64th)).
90. Burney, supra note 86, at 89-93 (describing Richardson and other cases adopting the two-grant
approach).
91. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984), abrogated by 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
92. See Bumey, supra note 86, at 83 (discussing the rise and fall of Alford).
93. 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991).
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remained unclear.94 In fact, years after Luckel, the appellate court in Concord
Oil resurrected the two-grant approach and held that the deed conveyed two
interests: the 1/96 mineral interest as expressed in the granting clause plus a
1/12 interest in royalties under an existing lease set forth in a second
paragraph.95 Because that existing lease had terminated, the issue before the
courts was whether the deed conveyed two interests or a single 1/12th mineral
interest.96
Eventually, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Court of Appeals
and held the Concord Oil deed conveyed "a single 1/12 mineral interest."97 In
the process, a plurality opinion provided the following guidelines. First, the
opinion reiterated Luckel's emphasis on harmonizing all clauses in a deed,
regardless of labels, to ascertain the intent of the parties, and rejected "bright
line" rules.98 Second, noting parties could include multiple grants in one deed,
the plurality noted the lack of such language in the Concord Oil deed.99
Because that deed reflected common terms in other multiclause deed forms,
that guidance lead to the demise of the two-grant approach.'" Third, Concord
Oil acknowledged the effect of the "estate misconception" and the "legacy of
the 1/8th lease royalty" on deed drafting. Although focused on the deed's
language, the plurality also viewed the estate misconception as "instructive, but
not dispositive" on the conflicting fraction issue."ot Recent court opinions now
incorporate Concord Oil's approach when interpreting deeds with conflicting
fractions and those raising other related issues, such as the "double fraction"
problem discussed below in Hysaw v. Dawkins.102
94. See Burney, supra note 86, at 97-101.
95. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451,454 (Tex. 1998).
96. Id.
97. Id at 453; see also Burney, supra note 42, at 120-23 ("Eventually, however, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Concord Oil, holding that the conflicting fractions could be harmonized from the
four-corners of the document") (citing Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 457-61). 1 say "eventually"
because we first had to overcome denial of writ of error, then we argued it and got a 5 to 4 decision, and
then because of changes in the court we had to argue the case again and got the final 4/1/4 decision. See
generally id. at 45 1.
98. See Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 454 ("we declined to rely on labels given to clauses, such
as 'granting,' 'warranty,' 'habendum,' and 'future lease."' (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 463
(Tex. 1991)); Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463 ("In particular, the labels we have given the clauses of
'granting,' 'warranty,' 'habendum' and 'future lease' are not controlling, and we should give effect to
the substance of unambiguous provisions.").
99. See Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 457 (noting the language in the Concord deed indicated
"that only a single 'estate' [was] being conveyed" and lacked any mention of "two-grant" terms).
100. Burney, supra note 42, at 124-26. But see Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 465 (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (viewing Concord deed as making two grants).
101. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 460.
102. See Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2016); Greer v. Shook, 503 S.W.3d 571, 580
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2016, pet. filed) ("[Allthough the "estate-misconception theory and the historical
use of 1/8 as the standard royalty may inform the meaning of fractions stated in multiples of 1/8 ...
these considerations are not alone dispositive. . . ."); Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) ("[A] warranty deed will pass all of the estate owned by the
grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are reservations or exceptions which reduce the estate
conveyed." (quoting Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1956))).
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3. Hysaw v. Dawkins: Approved for Adhering to the "Harmonizing"
Approach and for Rejecting a "Mechanical Approach" to Double Fractions
Before citing its 2016 opinion in Hysaw v. Dawkins, the Wenske majority
provides the following description of Texas's evolving approach to interpreting
mineral and royalty deeds.
Since Bass, our rules for deed construction have moved even more
decisively toward (1) a focus on the intent of the parties, expressed by the
language within the four corners of the deed, and (2) harmonizing all parts
of an instrument, even if particular parts appear contradictory or
inconsistent. As we recently reaffirmed, "[i]ntent must be determined by a
careful and detailed examination of the document in its entirety, rather
than by application of mechanical rules of construction that offer certainty
at the expense of effectuating intent."' 03
Hysaw involved another issue spawned by the "estate misconception" and
the "legacy of the 1/8th royalty": how to interpret documents that express a
non-participating royalty with double fractions, when one of those fractions is
the once-common 1/8th lease royalty (such as one-half of 1/8th)? This issue
has been labeled the "fixed versus floating" NPRI dilemma.104 In addressing
this issue, Texas appellate courts adopted differing approaches, which I have
described as either a "merely multiply" approach to the double fractions, or as
one that "analyzes" the double fractions considering the estate
misconception.05 Other writers have also advocated for one approach or the
other, with Professor Ernest Smith promoting the "analysis" approach'06 and a
treatise supporting the "merely multiply" approach."o' Because the Fourth
Court of Appeals in Hysaw adopted the "merely multiply" approach, the Texas
Supreme Court eventually addressed-and rejected-that "mechanical rule."'os
The Hysaw dispute required courts to interpret a mother's will rather than a
deed. In the will, the mother devised separate tracts of land to each of her three
children, but provided that each child would own non-participating royalty
interests beneath the separate tracts. To express the royalty interests devised,
103. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Luckel v. White,
819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991)); Anadarko Petroleum. Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex.
2002); Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 16. In addition to Luckel, the court cites Thompson. That case involved the
interpretation of an oil and gas lease that included the express term "capability of production" in the
habendum clause. Anadarko Petroleum. Corp., 94 S.W.3d at 555. Focusing on that plain term, the court
rejected the producer's argument that "capable of production" should be equated with the more common
lease phrase, "production in paying quantities." Id at 557-58.
104. Burney, supra note 42, at 116; see also Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 226 S.W.3d 490, 496
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied) (holding the language in the deed established a floating
royalty fraction rather than fixed).
105. Burney, supra note 42, at 126-133.
106. See Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The Legacy of the One-Eighth
Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 24-26 (2001).
107. Burney, supra note 42, at 127-28 ("Specifically, the Williams & Meyers Treatise argues that
double fractions should be multiplied under a plain meaning approach to document interpretation.").
108. See Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 8-9, 11-15.
15
TEXAS JOURNAL OF OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY LAW
the will provided that each child would receive "an undivided one-third (1/3) of
an undivided one-eighth (1/8) ... same being a non-participating royalty
interest."'"9 That "1/3 of 1/8th" description was repeated in another sentence
regarding each tract, and then a third sentence provided that "should there be
any royalty sold during [the mother's lifetime] then [each child] shall each
receive one-third of the remainder of the unsold royalty."110 Because the
mother had conveyed royalty interests in one of the tracts owned by the
Dawkins, they claimed the last sentence entitled them to 1/3rd of the 1/5th
landowner's lease royalty that they had negotiated for the minerals beneath
their tract."' However, the Dawkins viewed the other two sentences
expressing the royalty as "1/3 of 1/8th" as devising fixed 1/24th NPRIs to the
other two siblings, even though the fraction 1/24 did not appear in the will.112
Those siblings, the Hysaws, disagreed and viewed the will as having devised
each sibling equal "1/3 of any lease royalty" (or "floating" NPRIs) beneath
each separate tract.1 3 The trial court agreed with the Hysaws, but the Fourth
Court of Appeals reversed in the Dawkins' favor. 114
As in Concord Oil, which was an opinion that the Fourth Court failed to cite
in Hysaw, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court." 5 And like
Concord Oil and Luckel, a unanimous Hysaw opinion endorsed a "holistic
approach" aimed at ascertaining intent from all language in the document."16
However, the opinion also thoroughly considered the role of the "estate
misconception" and the "legacy of the 1/8th royalty.""7 For example, the
opinion criticizes merely multiplying fractions as a "mechanical approach" that
"fails to accord any significance to the use of double fractions.""8 After
reviewing other cases and all provisions in the will, the Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the 1/8th fraction was "shorthand" for the royalty a lessor would
reserve in any oil and gas lease, which supported the conclusion that each child
received a floating 1/3rd NPRI in each of the three tracts."19
In sum, in Hysaw, as in Concord Oil and Luckel, the Texas Supreme Court
rejected a mechanical approach for resolving the double fraction dilemma.
109. See id. at 4.
110. Id. at 14.
111. See id. at 5, 8-9 (noting that the will gave the right to execute leases to the child who owned
the surface of each of the three tracts).
112. Id. at 8, 16 (holding "Hysaw will devised a 1/3 fraction of royalty").
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Burney, supra note 42, at 135.
116. Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 8 ("[W]e have favored a holistic and harmonizing approach and rejected
mechanical rules of construction, such as giving priority to certain types of clauses over others or
requiring the use of magic words.").
117. Id at 10-11 (citing Burney, supra note 86, at 89); Burney, supra note 106, at 24.
118. Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 12.
119. Id. at 15-16. The Texas Supreme Court recently heard arguments in another case in which
Petitioners have asserted the Fourth Court of Appeals failed to analyze another related fraction issue, the
restated fraction issue. See generally U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC, v. Laborde Prop., L.P., 551 S.W.3d
148, 152 (Tex. 2018); see also Burney, supra note 42, at 127 n.78.
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Instead, the Court remained focused on the language of the document at issue
and on the primary goal of document interpretation: ascertaining the intent of
the parties. Additionally, by again acknowledging the effects of the "legacy of
the 1/8th royalty" and the estate misconception, the Texas Supreme Court
provided the guidance that courts and title examiners require, which will inject
certainty into oil and gas titles, another goal the Court cherishes.1 20
4. Moser, Averyt, Wood and Benge: Cited to Confirm a Commitment to
"Principles and Definitions Pronounced by this Court" and to "Continuity and
Predictability in the Law, Especially in the Oil-and-Gas Field"
After rejecting "mechanical rules" in favor of focusing on expressions of
intent in a document, the Wenske majority added the following provision:
Yet we are acutely aware that parties who draft agreements rely on the
principles and definitions pronounced by this Court. They rightly depend
on us for continuity and predictability in the law, especially in the oil-and-
gas field . . . . Our decision today does not vitiate the established
background principles of oil-and-gas law nor does it open for debate the
meaning of clearly defined terms in every deed dispute .... 121
The cases cited in support of this declaration include Moser v. US Steel122
and Averyt v. Grande.123 Both cases required the Court to address recurring
interpretation issues involving widely-used phrases appearing in mineral deeds.
In Moser, the Court answered pleas from commentators to overturn a
controversial approach to the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals." 24 This deed
phrase led to title disputes over substances other than oil or gas, such as coal,
lignite, and uranium. To protect the rights of surface owners, Texas courts had
developed the "the surface destruction" test for determining whether these
unlisted substances were "other minerals." Under that test, determining
ownership of these unnamed substances depended on fact-intensive inquiries,
such as the extractive processes used on the date of the deed, and the depth of
the substance.125 Moser involved a dispute over title to uranium when a deed
reserved "oil, gas and other minerals."l26  In that 1984 case, the Court
recognized that "[d]etermining the ownership of minerals [under the surface-
destruction test] has resulted in title uncertainty."1 27 For that reason, the Court
120. See Burney, supra note 42, at 142; see also Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Tex. 2015)
("The stakes are high, as the reliability of record title contributes mightily to the predictability of
property ownership that is so indispensable to our legal and economic systems.").
121. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. 2017).
122. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
123. 717 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1986).
124. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102. The controversial "surface destruction test" the Court had
adopted for interpreting this phrase generated volumes of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Laura H. Bumey,
"Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals" Clauses in Texas: Who's on First?, 41 S.W.L.J. 695, 696 n.7 (1988).
125. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 100-02 (describing decisions in Reed v. Wylie and Acker v. Guinn).
126. Id. at 100.
127. Id. at 101.
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instead adopted the "ordinary and natural meaning" test and held that uranium,
and other substances, are "minerals" and therefore belong to the owner of
"other minerals" conveyed or reserved in a deed.128
Averyt v. Grande involved another frequent issue arising in deed forms:
whether a reserved fractional interest in the mineral estate depends upon the
land "described" or the land being "conveyed" in the deed.129 The terms
"described" or "conveyed" refer to the final phrase in a reservation clause in
deed forms. For example, in Hooks v. Neill,'30 a grantor conveyed all of his
undivided one-half interest in a tract of land, but reserved a 1/32nd interest in
the land "conveyed."l3 ' The court in Hooks pointed to the word "conveyed"
and held that the grantor had reserved a 1/32nd interest of the one-half that he
owned and "conveyed." 32 In Averyt, the reservation clause referred to "an
undivided 1/4th of the royalty . . . from the lands above described."33 The
Court viewed the "above described" land as referring to the property
description of the entire tract, even though the deed was expressly made
"subject to" an undivided one-half interest owned by a third party.134 In other
words, although the grantor only owned an undivided one-half of the minerals,
the Court held he had reserved a 1/4th interest in the entire tract, rather than
only 1/4th of the one-half interest he owned.135
As in Luckel and Concord Oil, with Averyt and Moser, the Court promoted
title stability by providing answers for issues arising in common deed forms.
After Moser, title examiners could determine ownership of unnamed substances
without resort to factors outside the four-corners of a deed, and without resort
to litigation. Similarly, Averyt teaches that a reserved fraction should be
calculated according to either the "described" or "conveyed" phrase found in
the reservation clause. Both cases, in turn, provide drafting lessons for owners
conveying or reserving substances other than oil and gas, and for grantors
reserving fractional interests when they own less than 100% of the estate
conveyed. As the court in Wenske confirmed, the "principles and definitions"
pronounced in these cases remain "established background principles of oil-
and-gas law" in Texas.136
128. Id at 102. The court provided a list of other substances that belong to the surface as a matter of
law: building stone, limestone, water, caliche, and surface shale, and "near surface lignite, iron and
coal." Id. The Court also limited its decision prospectively to the date of the Moser deed, June 8, 1983.
Id. at 103. For a criticism of this prospective ruling and other aspects of the Moser opinion see Bumey,
supra note 124, at 696-97.
129. See Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1986).
130. 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App-Galveston 1929, writ ref'd).
131. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 538-39.
133. Averyt, 717 S.W.2d at 893.
134. See id. at 894-95.
135. Id. at 895 (citing King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W. 2d 260, 263 (1946)
(relying on the King case, which focused on the "described" versus "conveyed" distinction)). But see
Averyt, 717 S.W.2d at 898 (Ray and Williams, J.J., dissenting) (relying on the King rule to support their
dissent).
136. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 798 (Tex. 2017).
18 [Vol. 14:1
2019] MINERAL-DEED JURISPRUDENCE IN TEXAS: WENSKE V. EALY
Although the Texas Supreme Court pledged allegiance to "principles of oil-
and-gas law," the Wenske majority restates that language in a deed controls the
interpretative process.1 37 To emphasize this point, the Court cites two cases
from the 1950s, Wood v. Sims'38 and Benge v. Scharbauer.139  Ironically,
commentators had criticized these cases for propagating the "two grant"
doctrine, which, as described in the discussion of Concord Oil above, the Texas
Supreme Court later rejected.140 However, prior to Wenske, the Court had
refined its view of Wood and Benge as cases focused on a deed's language and
the "proposition that different estates in minerals may be conveyed by the same
instrument."l41 Repeating that view, Wenske cites Wood and Benge as support
for this basic principle: "Generally, 'the conveyance of an interest in the
minerals in place carries with it by operation of law the right to a corresponding
interest in the royalty." 42 Next, the majority opinion applies that principle to
the issue raised by the Wenske deed: "And under the same principle, a severed
fraction of the royalty interest-like the [prior NPRI]-generally would burden
the entire mineral estate because it necessarily limits the royalty interests
attached to the underlying minerals interests."43 To avoid this result, the
opinion continues to state that parties are free to contract differently. "
However, the majority found "no expression of such intent" in the Wenske
deed freeing the grantor's reserved mineral interest from the burden of the prior
NPRI.14 In particular, the majority rejects the Wenskes' view that the subject
to clause in the deed transferred the burden of the prior NPRI solely to the
Ealys.146 Instead, the opinion casts that approach as one of the mechanical
rules it rejects.147
B. Confirming the Role of Common Warranty Deed Form Clauses
1. The "Subject to" Clause and its "Principal Function": Protecting Grantors
from Breach of Warranty Claims
In rejecting the Wenskes' view of the subject to clause, the majority first
noted the ordinary meaning of that phrase: "The words 'subject to,' used in
137. See id.
138. 273 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. 1954).
139. 259 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1953).
140. Burney, supra note 86, at 91 n.110 (noting Williams and Meyers criticized Benge as
"deplorable").
141. Id at 94.




146. See id. at 798.
147. Id. at 797 ("And, declining to apply mechanical rules or require the use of 'magic words,' we
will not read such an intent into this document." (quoting Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex.
1991))).
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their ordinary sense, mean subordinate to, subservient to or limited by." 1 48
Next, the opinion applies that "ordinary" meaning when the clause appears in
warranty deeds: "[t]he principal function of a subject-to clause in a deed is to
protect a grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when some mineral
interest is already outstanding."1 49 To support that conclusion, the opinion
turns to a revered source in oil and gas law, the writings of Professor Ernest
Smith.
But the beguiling simplicity of the 'subject to' clause has often misled
conveyancers into using it for quite different purposes. As a long series of
cases has made painfully clear [use of a subject to] clause to perform some
function other than a limitation on the deed warranty is likely to introduce
an element of ambiguity into the deed which may be resolved only
through litigation.150
Professor Smith's critique of cases that misinterpreted the "subject to"
clause includes the "two grant" cases discussed above, which were ultimately
dethroned by Concord Oil's plain-meaning approach.151  Just as Concord Oil
found no "two grant" language in that subject to clause, the Wenske majority
found no language in that clause shifting the burden of an outstanding NPRI
solely to the grantees: "[G]iving the [deed's words] their plain meaning," the
subject to clause could not be construed "to say the parties intended the Ealys'
interest to be the sole interest subject to the NPRI."l 52 To achieve that result,
the opinion urges drafters to include additional language expressly addressing
how the burden of prior interests should be allocated.153
To summarize, the Wenske majority declined to expand the subject to clause
beyond its "principal function," which is to protect grantors from breaching
their warranties of title by placing grantees on notice of outstanding interests
burdening their title.1 54 Notably, that view of the subject to clause reflects
drafting instructions that accompany warranty deeds forms.15  While the
148. Id. at 796 (quoting Kokemot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W. 2d 528, 531 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1950, writ
ref'd)).
149. Id. at 816.
150. Id. at 796 (citing Smith, supra note 54, §15.01).
151. Smith, supra note 54, §15.01.
152. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 797. As further support for its conclusion, the majority provides an odd
cite, one to an 1882 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that determined the plain meaning of "minerals"
in the state. Id. at 797 ("But in this transaction between individual citizens for 55 acres in Lavaca
County, we think '[t]he best construction is that which is made by viewing the subject of the contract as
the mass of mankind would view it; for . .. it may be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which
the parties themselves viewed it."' (quoting Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (Pa. 1882))). The
dissent too found this use of authority odd. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 803 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
153. See id at 798. But see Brief for Buford as Amicus Curiae, supra note 59, at *1-3 (agreeing
with the Wenskes' view of Bass and the "subject to" clause). Mr. Burford had suggested that drafters
would need express "proportionate sharing" language to counter the "sole burden" result. Brief for
Buford as Amicus Curiae, supra note 59, at *5-6.
154. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 816 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
155. REAL ESTATE FORMS COMMITTEE, TEXAS REAL ESTATE FORMS MANuAL, 5-7-5, 1 5-7-8
(State Bar of Tex., 3rd ed. 2017) (The instructions that accompany the State Bar Deed Form specify that
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opinion does not cite those instructions, as noted above, it expresses concern
for "parties who draft agreements" and its respect for "the meaning of clearly
defined terms" in deeds.156
2. Reservations in Grantors, Exceptions "Made for All Purposes," and a Final
Subject to Proviso: Effective for Withholding Minerals from the Conveyance
and Protecting Grantors from Breaching Warranties of Title
Although the Wenskes focused primarily on the deed's subject to clause,
consistent with its emphasis on reviewing all language when interpreting deeds,
the majority opinion addresses other clauses. The deed, a standard form,
contained separate headings to accomplish different purposes. The
"Reservations from Conveyance" heading appears after the granting clause and
the property description. There the parties reserved "an undivided 3/8ths of all
oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the
Property."'1 7 With this clear statement of a reservation or withholding from the
conveyance, and single expression of the fraction (rather than the troublesome
double fractions), the parties did not dispute that the Ealys received only 5/8ths
of the mineral estate.151 Another sentence appeared under this heading: "If the
mineral estate is subject to existing production or an existing lease, the
production, the lease, and the benefits from it are allocated in proportion to
ownership in the minerals."' Indicating that this language contributed little to
the majority's conclusion, that opinion simply states that it, "strengthens our
confidence that the parties intended to split the benefits and burdens of the
minerals in the same proportion as their ownership of them." 60
Continuing through the deed form, the majority next turns to the separate
heading "Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty." The reference to the pre-
existing NPRI appears here and ends with a statement the Wenskes
emphasized: "reference to which instrument is here made for all purposes."'61
The majority quickly rejected the view that the "made for all purposes" phrase
aided the Wenskes' argument.162 Citing a 1956 Texas Supreme Court case,
Harris v. Windsor,163 the Wenske majority declared that "'For all purposes'
reservations by the grantor should read as "a reservation" and note the beneficiary of such reservation by
the words, "for the grantor.").
156. Id
157. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 793.
158. See id. at 796.
159. Id. at 798.
160. Id. at 798; see also Ciarlone, supra note 59 (criticizing the Wenske majority, but agreeing that
this added sentence was not outcome determinative).
161. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 799 ("Undivided one-fourth (1/4) interest in all of the oil, gas and other
minerals in and under the herein described property, reserved by Marian Vyvjala, et al. for a term of
twenty-five (25) years in instrument recorded in Volume 400, Page 590 of the Deed Records of Lavaca
County, Texas, together with all rights, express or implied, in and to the property herein described
arising out of or connected with said interest and reservation, reference to which instrument is here made
for all purposes.").
162. See id. at 798.
163. 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956).
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language may indeed put a grantor on notice that he is receiving an interest
subject to all restrictions and reservations contained in the deed . . . " but it
cannot "be reasonably construed as conveying the entire burden of the
outstanding NPRI to the Ealys."IM
Finally, the majority addressed a common clause at the end of the deed,
which repeats the subject to phrase the Wenskes had viewed as key to their
position: "Grantor, for the Consideration and subject to the Reservations from
Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty, grants, sells and
conveys" the property.'6 5 Discussing the overall effect of the language under
all of these headings, the majority held they indicated "an intent to avoid a
breach of warranty (and therefore an over-conveyance problem), rather than a
clear attempt to reserve a full 3/8ths interest, free of the [NPRI] to the
Wenskes."16 6 Having completed its analysis of the entire deed, the majority
reiterated it contained no language supporting the Wenskes' view of the title-
and the burden-they conveyed to the Ealys.167
C. The Wenske Deed Form Provides Clarity by Separating "Reservations in
Grantors" and "Exceptions" Intended to Prevent Breach of Warranty-a
Comparison to Recent Opinions
The majority's reaffirmation of the role of form deed clauses provides an
obvious lesson regarding the narrow issue raised in the Wenske dispute. These
standard clauses do not shift the burden of prior NPRIs entirely to the grantee
when the grantor reserves a share of the minerals; instead, should the parties
intend that result, clear language stating that intent must appear in the deed.
Additionally, the Wenske dispute provides a broader lesson on a different issue,
which this article labels the "reservation from conveyance or exception from
warranty" issue. That issue arises when parties dispute whether language in
warranty deeds serves to reserve (withhold) interests in the grantor, or to except
prior interests in the chain of title to protect grantors from breaching their
warranty of title. The clarity provided through the separate headings in the
Wenske deed form avoided any disputes over this issue. However, decisions
spawned by a different Texas Warranty Deed Form in two recent Texas
appellate decisions, Boundsl6 8 and Bupp,169 fail to clarify the law on this
interpretation problem. Similarly, in Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital
164. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 797-98.
165. Id. at 793.
166. Id. at 797.
167. Id. at 798 ("This deed (1) granted the minerals to the Ealys, (2) reserved 3/8ths of the minerals
to the Wenskes, and (3) put the Ealys on notice that the entirety of the minerals are subject to the
outstanding 1/4th Vyvjala NPRI to avoid a warranty claim.").
168. Bounds v. Prudhomme, No. 12-15-00177-CV, 2016 WL 1254072 (Tex. App.-Tyler
Mar. 31, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op).
169. Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 280408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Jan. 3, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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Partners, Ltd.,170 the Texas Supreme Court recently missed the opportunity to
clarify the law on this "reservation v. exception" issue, and to extend Wenske 's
dismissal of the Pich decision, discussed above.
Recall that the Wenske deed form had separate headings under which the
parties inserted language intended to accomplish different purposes. Under the
"Reservations from Conveyance" heading, the parties stated that the grantors
were reserving or withholding "3/8ths of the minerals" under the land conveyed
and described above. To provide notice to the grantee about prior outstanding
interests affecting the title, the NPRI appeared under the "Exceptions from
Conveyance and Warranty" heading. The use of these headings reflects law
that Texas cases have long recognized. A warranty deed will pass all interests
a grantor owns, absent "clear language" reserving interests in the grantor;
moreover, warranty deeds convey the "greatest estate" possible to a grantee.171
Merely stating that a conveyance is subject to prior interests is not sufficient to
reserve an interest; rather, it serves to prevent a breach of warranty of title. 172
These basic conveying principles appear not only in the Wenske majority
opinion, but in other Texas Supreme Court opinions, and in opinions I discuss
(and approve) above, including the appellate decisions in Bass and Pich (and
the Pich dissent). In resolving a dispute with a different deed form, one
appellate opinion, Bounds v. Prudhomme,73 applied these basic principles.174
On the other hand, a different appellate opinion, Bupp v. Bishop,175 which cites
Wenske for support, takes a different path to a contradictory result.176
1. Bounds v. Prudhomme: Language beneath a "triple concept heading" was
insufficient to reserve minerals in grantors and instead protected against breach
of warranty
Unlike the Wenske deed form, the deeds at issue in Bounds and Bupp
involved an earlier iteration of a State Bar of Texas Deed Form.17 7 This form
contained, not separate headings, but a single heading that the Bounds opinion
170. 546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018).
171. See Day & Co. Inc. v. Texiand Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990) (defining
"the 'greatest possible estate' rule" as "a common law property principle which states 'that a warranty
deed will pass all of the estate owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there are
reservations or exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed."' (quoting Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur
Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. 1957))).
172. See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 796; see also Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)
(holding that the subject to language in the deed "did not reserve the interest in the minerals to [grantor];
it only excepted it from the grant.").
173. No. 12-15-00177-CV, 2016 WL 1254072 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 31, 2016, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
174. Id. at *2.
175. No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 280408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 3, 2018, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).
176. Id. at *2. In the interest of full disclosure, I was hired to assist in the appeals of the Bupp v.
Bishop dispute, including the petition for review of the Fourth Court's opinion reversing the trial court
which was ultimately denied by the Texas Supreme Court.
177. Id. at * 1-2; Bounds, 2016 WL 1254072, at *3.
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labels a "triple concept heading."7 8  That heading reads as follows:
"Reservations from and Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty."179 Notably,
unlike the separate headings in the Wenske deed, this form combines, or
"lumps" together, as one commentator described the form, the "reservations
from conveyance" and "exceptions from warranty" concepts into one
heading.'8 0 As revealed below, to avoid litigation over whether references are
"reservations" or "exceptions," drafters should avoid this deed form.
The issue in Bounds was whether the grantors had reserved any interests in
the mineral estate, or whether language under the heading served instead to
protect grantors from breaching their warranty of title.' 8 ' Asserting the deed
unambiguously reserved the minerals, the grantors pointed to this sentence that
appeared immediately below the heading: "TITLE to any of the oil, gas and
other minerals, in, under and that may be produced from the above-described
real property, together with all rights, privileges and immunities relating
thereto, including the following [i. and ii.]." 82 Items i. and ii. were "mineral
reservations" in a 1934 and a 1971 deed that included the recording information
for each.'8 3 The Tyler Court rejected the argument that the added sentence
reserved minerals in the grantor because, "[iun order to reserve the mineral
estate, clear language expressing that intent was needed." 84  Regarding the
effect of the listed exceptions (i. and ii.), the Tyler court held:
Here, under the triple concept heading, the deed merely states that there is
a mineral reservation set out in a 1934 instrument and a mineral
reservation set forth in the 1971 Prud'homme instrument, which is the
common source of title to the subject property. The deed does not specify
that the grantor, in 2001, is reserving a mineral interest from conveyance
and warranty . . . We will not interpret the deed as creating a reservation
by implication.' 8 5
Citing another Tyler court's decision in Melton v. Davis, the Bounds court
explained that had the parties intended to reserve interests in the grantors, "they
could have done so by apt language specifically and unequivocally expressing
such intent." 86 The Texas Supreme Court denied the grantors' petition for
review in Bounds.
178. Bounds, 2016 WL 1254072, at *3.
179. Id. at *3.
180. Richard F. Brown, Recent Texas Oil and Gas Cases, 42.3 OIL, GAS & ENERGY RES. L. SEC.
REPORT 7, 15 (2018).
181. Bounds, 2016 WL 1254072, at *1.
182. Id at *3-4.
183. Id.
184. Id at *3.
185. Id
186. Id. at *4 (citing Melton v. Davis, 443 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that if appellees had intended to reserve the disputed minerals, they could have done so
by apt language specifically and unequivocally expressing such intent)).
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2. Bupp v. Bishop: Language Beneath "Triple Concept" Heading Served to
"Except" Grantors' Royalties from Conveyance Rather than to Protect Grantors
from Breach of Warranty
The appellate court in Bupp cites Bounds with approval, but reaches a
different result. The deed form and the issue were the same in both cases:
whether the deed form with the "triple concept heading" contained language
sufficient to withhold any of the grantors' interests, here non-participating
royalty interests, from the conveyance.'8 As in Bounds, the court focused on
language appearing below the heading in a 2009 deed. Unlike the deed in
Bounds, the Bupp deed lacked the extra sentence appearing immediately below
the heading. 18 Like Bounds, the Bupp deed listed interests that appeared in the
grantors' chain of title. 189  In fact, the four listed items had been copied
verbatim from a title policy the parties had obtained:
a. Any visible and/or apparent roadway and/or easement over or across
the subject property the existence of which does not appear of record.
b. Rights of Parties in Possession.
c. Terms, conditions and stipulations of Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease from
Anita Forister to Hawthorn Energy Partners, L.L.C., dated May 4, 2007,
and recorded in Volume 857, Page 242, of the Official Records of Karnes
County, Texas.
d. Royalty interest, the royalties, and all other rights in connection with
said royalty rights, described in the Will of Martha Forister, and recorded
in Cause No. 3656 of the Probate Records of Kames County, Texas,
reference to which instrument is here made for [sic] all purposes.1
90
The Bishops (Grantees) argued that all four items appeared to protect the
grantors from breaching their warranty of title.191 Regarding item (d), the
Grantees argued that, like items (a)-(c), listing the reference to royalty interests
described in the Will of Martha Forister protected grantors from breaching their
warranty of title because, due to the Will, the grantors' siblings owned non-
participating royalties in the land conveyed.192 In fact, once the parties learned
that the grantors did not own all of the royalties beneath the 140 acres being
conveyed, they amended their real estate contract to provide that "grantors will
convey "100% of the Royalty and minerals which they own in the 140 acres ...
187. Brief for Appellees, Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2017 WL 3262448, *17 (2017)
(No. 18-0256).
188. Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at * 17.
189. Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *16-17.
190. Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *1.
191. Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *12; see Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *1 ("In the
underlying cause, the appellees, who are the grantees or the successors of the grantees under a warranty
deed dated December 17, 2009, sued the appellants, who are the grantors or the successors of the
grantors, seeking a declaration that the deed did not reserve or except any royalty interests in favor of
the grantors.").
192. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *3, *18; Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *3 (holding
"[t]he deed excepted the entire royalty interest described in Martha's will from conveyance.").
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"193 Reflecting that agreement, an express reservation clause stating the
grantors were reserving minerals and royalties was deleted from a draft deed.1 94
The Bupps (Grantors) argued that item (d), the reference to the Will,
excepted or reserved all the royalties the Grantors owned.195 The trial court
ruled in favor of the Grantees.196 On appeal to the Fourth Court, the Grantees
urged the court to affirm that ruling based not only on the plain language of the
deed, which they argued lacked clear reservation language as required under
Texas law, but also because "canons of construction" and "surrounding
circumstances" confirmed that interpretation.197 Specifically, the Grantees
noted that courts, including other Fourth Court of Appeals opinions, construe
deeds to convey the "greatest estate possible," decline to imply reservations by
implication, and construe exceptions as intended to prevent breach of warranty
rather than as reservations from the conveyance.198
Without hearing oral arguments, a three-judge panel reversed the trial court
and held that all four items under the heading were "exceptions."l99 Regarding
item (d) the appellate court held: "The exception unambiguously refers to all of
the royalty interest and royalty rights described in Martha's will." 200 Because
the interests owned by the "grantors were 'not outstanding in another,"' the
grantors' royalty interests remained in them.20 1 in support of that conclusion,
the court of appeals cited Pich v. Lankford, discussed above.202 Additionally,
early in its analysis, the appellate court cited and quoted Wenske v. Ealy: "The
Texas Supreme Court has recently instructed that if a court can ascertain the
parties' intent from the language of the deed, 'that should [generally] be the end
of our analysis' . . . In that circumstance, '[a]pplying default rules or other
mechanical rules of construction to determine the deed's meaning is . . . both
unnecessary and improper."'203 Pointing to this quote from Wenske, in their
193. Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *6.
194. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *5-6.
195. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *11.
196. Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *1.
197. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *8, *31.
198. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 187, at *19-20.
199. Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *3.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Fourth Court also cited a footnote from another Texas Supreme Court opinion, Patrick
v. Barrett, 734 S.W. 2d 646, 648 n.1 (Tex. 1987): "Our construction of the exception in this case is
supported by the reasoning of the court of appeals in Klein. In Klein, the court of appeals held that the
exception is to be deducted from the whole conveyance of a mineral interest. Klein at 913. This part of
the court of appeals' opinion was specifically approved by this court. Klein, 86 S.W.2d at 1078; cf
Coyne v. Butler, 396 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, no writ). In Coyne, the court
held as follows:
Well settled rules are applicable here. A reservation operates for the benefit of the grantor,
and it serves to retain in him his ownership to the extent stated. An exception, however, is no
more than an exclusion from the grant and operates to the benefit of the grantor only to the
extent that ownership in the excepted interest is vested in the grantor and is not outstanding
in another person. (emphasis added).
203. Bupp, 2018 WL 280408, at *2.
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petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court, the Grantees urged the Court to
clarify whether Wenske has "rejected" interpretative rules and canons the court
of appeals did not address.204 Specifically, although the Grantees urged the
appellate court to consider canons of construction and the circumstances
surrounding execution of the deed, the Fourth Court's opinion never addressed
those arguments.
While the Bishops' petition for review was pending, the Texas Supreme
Court issued two opinions that the Bishops viewed as supporting their
positions. First, regarding the role of "surrounding circumstances" evidence in
the deed interpretation process, the Bishops pointed to URI v. Kleberg.205 In
that case, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that: "Because objective
intent controls the inquiry, only circumstantial evidence that is objective in
nature may be consulted. We have accordingly described surrounding
circumstances as including 'the commercial or other setting in which the
contract was negotiated and other objectively determinable factors that give a
context to the transaction between the parties."206 Second, the Bishops viewed
Perryman as supporting their arguments that the deed in dispute lacked the
"clear language" Texas courts require to view a deed as reserving mineral or
royalty interests in grantors.2 07 Because the Texas Supreme Court denied the
Bishops' petition, and Perryman, as discussed below, provides mixed
messages, Texas law remains unclear on the "reservation from conveyance or
exception from warranty" issue.
3. Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd: Mixed Views on Effect
of "Less, Save and Except" Clause and the Precedential Value of Pich
Unlike Bupp and Bounds, the "reservation or exception" issue in Perryman
focused not on the "triple concept heading," but on the common deed-form
phrase found in Pich, "less, save and except."208 In Perryman, the Texas
Supreme Court held that language-at least regarding the 1983 deed in
dispute-failed to satisfy Texas's "clear language" requirement for effective
reservations of interests in grantors.20 9 The issue in Perryman was whether that
deed, which contained a clause that "saves and excepts" "one-half of all
royalties from the production of oil, gas and/or other minerals that may be
produced from the above described premises which are now owned by
Grantor," had reserved royalties in the grantors.210 The grantors argued that
204. See Petition for Review at 15-16, Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 280408
(2018) (No. 18-0256), 2018 WL 3693418.
205. 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018).
206. Id at 768.
207. Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tex. 2018).
208. Id. at 114.
209. Id at 119 (quoting Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)).
210. Id. at 114, 121.
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they had reserved one-half of the royalties that they owned.211 The 1983 deed
did not mention a royalty reservation in an earlier 1977 deed.212
Citing Pich, the Perryman opinion held the 1983 deed did not reserve
royalties in the grantors; instead, the "less, save and except" language served as
an exception to protect the grantors from breaching their warranty of title:
"Although an 'exception' can refer to any 'mere exclusion from the grant,' a
'reservation' must always be in favor of and for the benefit of the grantor. "'213
Additionally, citing another Texas Supreme Court case the Bishops stressed in
their case, Sharp v. Fowler, the Perryman opinion proclaimed that, "[wie do
not agree with the parties or the court of appeals that the 'less, save and except'
clause reserved any royalty interest for the grantors. We will not find
'reservations by implication.' A reservation of minerals to be effective must be
by clear language."214
Despite the Texas Supreme Court's apparent embrace of the "clear
language" requirement for reservations in the interpretation process, Perryman
contradicts that view in discussing the same language in the prior 1977 deed in
the parties' chain of title. In 1977, Ben Perryman conveyed a tract to his son
and daughter-in-law with the "less, save and except" clause of "an undivided
one-half of all royalties" from the land.215 Ben owned all the minerals and
royalties at that time.2 16 The Texas Supreme Court held the 1977 deed had
reserved the one-half royalty interest for the grantor, while the 1983 deed, with
the same phrase, was not a reservation of any interests in the grantor, but
instead, was an exception to the grantor's warranty of title.217 In explaining the
different treatment of the same phrase, the Perryman opinion again cites Pich:
"Although Ben's [1977] deed did not expressly 'reserve' the 2 royalty interest
for himself, 'the legal effect of the language excepting it from the grant was to
leave it to the grantor.' "218 As one commentator summarized the Perryman
opinion, "So in one deed, the 'save and except' language was construed as a
reservation, but in the other deed it was construed as an exception to the
grantor's warranty of title, not a reservation."219 Considering Perryman 's
mixed messages on the "reservations or exceptions" issue, and the title
uncertainty created by the different approaches by appellate courts in Bupp and
211. Id. at 117.
212. Id at 114.
213. Id at 119 (citing Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)).
214. Id at 119 (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)).
215. Id. at 113-14.
216. Id. at 113.
217. Id. at 125.
218. Id at 125 (citing Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957)).
219. John McFarland, Reservations vs. Exceptions, Ow AND GAS LAWYER BLOG (May 11, 2018),
https://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/reservations-vs-exceptions/ ("Deeds like these create huge
headaches for title examiners. Drafters loosely use 'less and except' and 'save and except' both to
describe prior reservations and to reserve interests in the grantor. The better practice is to always use
'reserve' when intending to reserve a royalty or mineral interest in the grantor, and use 'subject to' when
describing prior mineral and royalty reservations.").
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Bounds, Texas courts will face more "reservations or exceptions" deed
interpretation disputes as the Shale Era continues.
1II. THE WENSKE DISSENTING OPINION: FOUR JUSTICES REJECT THE MAJORITY
OPINION
A. Contradictory Views of Case Law and the "Subject o" Clause
Perryman, unlike Wenske, did not produce a dissent. And in that unified
opinion, as described above, the Texas Supreme Court cited Pich v. Lankford,
an opinion I criticize, with approval. The Wenske majority, however, limits
the precedential value of Pich and Bass, while a dissenting opinion signed by
four justices, and written by the author of Perryman, defends those opinions.220
The defense it mounts for those cases, however, lacks any analysis of the
weaknesses on display in these decades-old Supreme Court opinions. In
addition to the dissenters' disagreement about those and other opinions,22 1 its
trenchant criticism of the majority opinion repeats this mantra regarding the
subject to clause: "The only thing 'subject to' anything is the interest granted to
the grantees . .. Under the deed's plain language, only the interest granted to
the grantees is 'subject to' the excepted interest . .. But the Court never
considers what, under the deed's language, is 'subject to' what." 222
As described above, however, the majority analyzed the meaning and role of
the subject to clause and reached a conclusion consistent with precedent and
practice.
220. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. 2017) (Boyd, J., dissenting) (Justice Boyd was
joined in his dissent by Justice Willett, Justice Lehrmann, and Justice Devine). Regarding Bass, the
dissenting opinion proclaimed, "I can find no valid reason in the Court's opinion for its conclusion that
Bass is inapplicable here or that, 'in light of our evolving mineral-deed-construction jurisprudence,
courts and practitioners should view Bass as limited to the specific language at issue in that case."' Id. at
816. As for Pich, the dissent approves of that opinion's "methodological" approach and, in response to
the majority's rejection of Pich's default rule the dissent responds that "so-called 'default rules' often
reflect and enforce controlling legal realities, and parties often rely on such rules once we announce
them." Id. at 806.
221. The dissent also contains a lengthy discussion of other cases that, in my opinion, fail to support
the dissent's position. For example, the opinion spends a paragraph discussing Duhig v. Peavey Moore.
Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 807-08. That infamous opinion developed a unique title rule that estops a
grantor from retaining title to minerals when he over conveys in a warranty deed. Id. at 807-08. An
over-conveyance occurred because the deed lacked a "subject to" clause providing notice to the grantee
about a prior reservation of interest in the mineral estate. In Wenske, however, the parties avoided the
Duhig problem by expressly including a subject to clause, a fact the majority understood. Id. at 794. As
another example, the dissent discusses an obscure 1966 appellate decision, Bristow v. Selman, but fails
to understand that the Duhig rule dictated the result in that case. Id. at 812 ("The Court rejected that
argument and expressly agreed with the court of appeals, noting only briefly that the Court was 'not
concerned with the Duhig rule' in Pich and the Pich rule 'should be read in that light."' (quoting
Bristow v. Selman, 406 S.W.2d 896, 896 (Tex. 1966))).
222. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 799, 801 (Boyd, J. dissenting).
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B. The Dissent's Misguided Detour to the "Two Grant" Theory (Fortunately
Derailed Recently by the Texas Supreme Court in ConocoPhillips Co. v.
Koopmann)
On one level, the differences between the majority and dissenting opinions
in Wenske reflect a common phenomenon in document interpretation cases:
different judges have different views of case law and of "plain terms" in
documents.2 23 However, the dissenters' detour to the "two grant" theory
reflects a misunderstanding of that theory, and deeper confusion about the
effect of reservations of interests in common warranty deed forms:
In the context of royalty reservations, courts of appeals have described
what they call the 'two-grant' theory. This theory envisions that when a
grant is subject to a reservation, the grantor conveys all of the granted
interests to the grantee and then receives back the interest reserved, such
that there are actually two grants-at least at a theoretical level. Although
we have not expressly adopted or confirmed this theory, it finds some
conceptual support in our recognition that reservations create 'new'
interests. The two-grant theory may help to explain the difference
between a deed that conveys only a partial interest and a deed that conveys
an entire interest but reserves a part of that interest.224
Applying this theory to the Wenske deed, the dissenters determined the deed
had first conveyed all of the Wenskes interests to the Ealys, but then through
the reservation clause, re-conveyed the stated reserved fractional interest to the
Wenskes, which freed them from bearing any burden of the prior NPRI. 225
Lacking in the dissent's discussion is an understanding, first, of the correct
label for the theory, and second, of the narrow instance in which courts of
appeal had applied this theory. As explained in the Bagby and Koopmann
appellate opinions that the dissent cites above, the courts of appeal had applied
a "grant and re-grant" fiction to avoid invalidating the "springing executory"
interest created in a grantee when the grantor in a deed reserved a term mineral
or royalty interest.226 That issue was not raised by the Wenske deed.
223. See Laura H. Burney, The "Post-Production Costs" Issue in Texas and Louisiana:
Implications for the Fate of Implied covenants and Pro-Lessor Clauses in the Shale Era Oil and Gas
Lease, 48 ST. MARY'S L.J. 599, 618 (2017) (describing judges' varying views of the same terms in
leases, "Demonstrating again that plain terms are never plain. . . ."); see also Heritage Res., Inc. v.
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 131 (Tex. 1996) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (disputing plurality opinion's
interpretation of lease terms and proclaiming, "What could be more clear?").
224. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 806 (Boyd, J., dissenting) (citing ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann,
No. 13-14-00402-CV, 2016 WL 2967689, at *9 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May 19, 2016, pet. granted)
(mem. op.) (citations omitted)).
225. See Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 807 ("Second, under the two-grant theory, the reservation (to
which the grant was subject) separately grants the 3/8ths mineral interest back to the Wenskes. Although
the interest granted to the Ealys is "subject to" the exception for Vyvjala's interest (which burdens the
entire 8/8ths mineral interest granted to the Ealys), the grant of the 3/8ths interest back to the Wenskes
(through the reservation) is not.").
226. ConocoPhillips, Co. v. Koopmann, 542 S.W.3d 643, 657 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2016,
pet. granted), affd 2018 WL 1440639 (Tex. 2018); Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190, 195-96 (Tex.
App.-Austin, 1981 no writ). To be fair to the dissent, the Koopmann opinions also uses the "two-grant
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Fortunately, the Texas Supreme Court accepted the petition for review in
Koopmann and rejected the dissent's suggestion that courts should validate and
expand the role of the "two grant" theory.22 7 The deed in Koopmann used the
"triple concept heading" form that led to the disputes in Bounds and Bupp.2 28
However, because clear reservation language appeared, the parties did not
contest the estates created by the deed. Those estates were a reserved term
royalty interest in the grantor, and a "springing executory" interest in the
grantee.229 One issue in the case was whether the springing executory interest
was void under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP).23 0 If that
interest were void, the grantor would own the reserved interest free and clear of
any rights the deed expressed in the grantee. Both the appellate and Texas
Supreme Court opinions recognize that because the grantee's interest could vest
beyond the period permitted by RAP, it would be void. 231  However, the
appellate court invoked the "grant and re-grant fiction" and held that the
interest was valid.232 That fiction effectively assumes that the parties used two
deeds that ultimately created a vested interest in the original grantee, one not
subject to RAP.2 33
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that the interest created by the deed in the
grantee was valid.23 4  However, after conducting a thorough review of the
history and purpose of RAP, and the views expressed in oil and gas law
treatises and articles, the Texas Supreme Court unanimously declined to invoke
that fiction.235 Reflecting the trend approved in Wenske, including a dedication
to respecting the parties' intent as expressed in a deed, in Koopmann the Court
concluded, "the two-grant theory is not a canon of construction; it is a
theory" label, but clarifies the role and nature of that approach as a fiction confined to avoiding RAP as
applied to springing executory interests. ConocoPhillips Co., 542 S.W.3d at 657-58.
227. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Tex. 2018).
228. Id. at 862. The deed stated:
RESERVATIONS FROM AND EXCEPTIONS TO CONVEYANCE AND WARRANTY:
1. There is EXCEPTED from this conveyance and RESERVED to the Grantor and her heirs
and assigns for the term hereinafter set forth one-half (1/2) of the royalties from the
production of oil, gas . . . and all other minerals . . . which reserved royalty interest is a non-
participating interest and is reserved for the limited term of 15 years from the date of this
Deed and as long thereafter as there is production in paying or commercial quantities of oil,
gas, or said other minerals from said land or lands pooled therewith.
229. See id. at 868.
230. Id. at 868-71. The opinion also addressed two other issues. First, the court rejected the
argument that the Natural Resources Code Section 91.402(b), allowing payors to place funds in suspense
in light of title dispute, preempted other causes of action, such as breach of contract. See id at 881; TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE § 91.402(a)-(b). Second, the Koopmann deed had express language that could have
extended the grantor's reserved interest, which the court considered ambiguous, therefore, the court
remanded that issue to the trial court. See id.
231. See id at 869.
232. See id. at 872.
233. See id
234. See id. at 873.
235. See id. at 869 (citing WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 335 (2017); 1 EUGENE
KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.3 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.); Laura H. Burney,
A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Nex Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY,
NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 1, 45 (1996)).
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substitute for the written language of the instrument, created by the court to
achieve a result that would not otherwise occur."2 36 Instead, the Court held that
exempting the interest from RAP "would be consistent with the purpose of the
Rule as we have stated it because alienability and productivity of reserved
mineral interests would be facilitated, not hindered."237 Therefore, the Texas
Supreme Court held that, "because at the time it was created the [grantees']
Koopmanns' future interest in the NPRI was certain to vest and did not
interfere with the Rule's purpose, we hold that the Rule does not invalidate this
interest."238
Although the opinion expressed concern with title certainty, which writers
have argued would require uniformly exempting springing interests created in
deeds with term reservations from RAP,239 the Koopmann opinion retreats from
that view. Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court added this caveat: "We limit
our holding to future interests in the oil and gas context in which the holder of
the interest is ascertainable and the preceding estate is certain to terminate."240
In light of this express limitation, Koopmann may not prevent all grantors from
claiming that RAP has freed their reserved term interests in minerals or
royalties from a grantee's "springing executory" interest.
IV. CONCLUSION: WENSKE'S POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO TEXAS'S MINERAL-
DEED JURISPRUDENCE AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
Interpreting the Wenske deed, as the majority proclaimed at the beginning of
its opinion, allowed the Texas Supreme Court to "reinforce a trend in our
mineral-deed jurisprudence."241 In the process, the Court identified cases
consistent with this trend, and those at odds with that "evolving"
jurisprudence.242 As discussed above, the Court approved of the analysis it
adopted in cases addressing specific interpretation issues raised by common
deed forms or drafting practices. In those cases, including Concord Oil,
Luckel, Hysaw, Moser, and Averyt, the Court resolved narrow issues, while at
the same time, pledging allegiance to the goal in all document interpretation
cases, ascertaining the intent of the parties as expressed in the entire document.
236. Id at 872.
237. Id. at 869 (citing Burney, supra note 235, at 45 ("Only the straightforward exemption for most
oil and gas interests ... would guarantee title certainty.")).
238. See id. at 873.
239. Id. at 869 ("This would be consistent with the purpose of the Rule as we have stated it because
alienability and productivity of reserved mineral interests would be facilitated, not hindered.") (citing
Burney, supra note 235, at 45). The opinion also cites the Williams & Meyers Treatise on Oil and Gas
Law, which also advocates for uniformly "exempting" these interests from RAP. Id at 869 (citing
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 335 (2017)).
240. Id at 873. One could argue that with this sentence the court had not intended to narrow its
holding regarding the application of RAP to springing executory interests created by term reservations,
but to preserve its analysis to springing executory interests created by poorly drafted top deeds and top
leases. Id. at 866-68 (discussing Peveto v. Starkey and BP v. Laddex, two Texas Supreme Court cases
addressing respectively whether a top deed or a top lease violated RAP).
241. Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 792 (Tex. 2017).
242. See id. at 795 (discussing and limiting Bass v. Harper to its facts).
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Additionally, recognizing the unique impact of deed interpretation cases, the
Court considered the implications of its decisions on drafting and title
stability.243
Wenske follows the trend it identifies by addressing a narrow issue and
examining all language in the deed. After adhering to that process, the Court
held that terms in this common warranty deed form, including the subject to
clause, did not express intent to transfer the burden of a prior NPRI solely to
the grantee.244 That conclusion should curtail future disputes asserting the
same claim. For future deeds, Wenske encourages drafters to address the "prior
NPRI" issue with express language allocating the burden between grantors and
grantees.245  The majority's analysis also clarified the role of standard deed
clauses, particularly the subject to clause, which it views as intended to protect
grantors from breaching their warranties of title, absent other language
changing that role.246 In reaching that conclusion, the Court also clarified case
law, particularly by limiting the precedential value of two problematic Texas
Supreme Court cases, Bass v. Harper and Pich v. Lankford.247
As in past decades, the Texas Supreme Court will continue to address issues
affecting "our mineral-deed jurisprudence." For example, recent appellate
opinions, Bupp and Bounds, reached contradictory conclusions when
interpreting a different warranty deed form and determining whether language
beneath a "triple concept heading" had "reserved" or "excepted" royalty or
mineral interests from the conveyance.248  Moreover, as revealed in the
discussion of Perryman, the mixed messages in that opinion failed to clarify the
law on that issued. Perryman also cited Pich with approval, while the Wenske
majority dismissed Pich to the extent it created a "default" rule on the prior-
NPRI-burden issue.249 Neither Wenske nor Perryman directly addressed the
"false recital" aspect of the Pich opinion. Additionally, as I note above, while
Koopmann derailed the dissent's misguided approval of a "two grant" theory
for analyzing reservations in warranty deeds, that decision may not have fully
foreclosed arguments that "springing executory interests" created in mineral
deeds are void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. When these and other
243. Id. at 798.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See id at 796-97.
247. See id. at 795; see also Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, LTD., 546 S.W.3d I10,
119 (Tex. 2018) (noting that the Court's recent opinion in Perryman, however, appears to cite Pich with
approval, yet it departs from Pich by holding that a "less, save and except" clause in a deed did not
operate as a reservation withholding royalties in the grantor).
248. See Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04-16-00827-CV, 2018 WL 280408, *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Jan. 3, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the language under the heading created an exception
from conveyance that prevented the entire royalty interest from passing to the grantees); Bounds v.
Prudhomme, No. 12-15-00177-CV, 2016 WL 1254072, *3-4 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 31, 2016, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the language following the heading created an exception to warranty,
which failed to create an express reservation, and thus, title to the mineral estate passed to the grantees).
249. Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 795-96.
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issues reach the justices' chambers, the Texas Supreme Court should adhere to
the trend it identified and followed in Wenske as it continues to develop
Texas's mineral-deed jurisprudence in the next chapter of the Shale Era.
